

THE SAMPLER

“Tiruray Morality” from Tiruray Justice

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Chapter 2 Tiruray Morality

I spent most of the morning speaking with an old man about the customs (*ʔadat*) surrounding a wedding ceremony. He asked at one point whether I had ever seen a Maguindanao wedding and explained that they have a very different set of customs which comes out of their written law (*kitab*). “The Maguindanao have their Koran,” he said, “but we cannot read or write; our kitab is the ʔadat.”¹

TO TIRURAY, in one fundamental sense of the word, the ʔadat of a people is their customs, the things they customarily do, the activities that mark them as a distinctive cultural entity. The Maguindanao have their ʔadat; the Americans have theirs; the Tiruray, theirs. Early in my fieldwork among the Tiruray, I learned that such questions as “Why do you do that?” or “Why is it like that?” or “Why is it done in that fashion?” were all one-way, dead-end streets leading to the inevitable reply, “It is the ʔadat.” They do what they do, in the way they do it, because it is the Tiruray custom to do it, and in

1. Throughout this book, indented extracts not otherwise identified come more or less directly from my field notes. Most of what was recorded in the Tiruray vernacular I have translated into English, and I have made a few editorial improvements in the original prose.

that way. Why do Tiruray press hands one way when departing, whereas American shake hands a different way when they leave? Because each has his own ?adat.

?Adat, however, has another fundamental meaning: respect. In this sense, it can be used not only as a noun but as a verb, meaning to pay respect to someone or something. The two senses, custom and respect, are by no means discrete for Tiruray; they are aspects of a single idea. The customs aim at respect. Respect is what customs are for. It is, in fact, what customs are—?adat. One can speak of an individual's ?adat (or a family's) with the same combined meaning, both of someone's characteristic behavior and of the quality of his respect for the feelings of other people. Frequently I have heard it said that some marriage is a difficult one because one of the couple has a bad ?adat, even though the person comes from a family known for its good ?adat. When the marriage was arranged, it is implied, there was nothing in the respectful, considerate ways of the errant spouse's parents and kinsmen to warn the prospective in-laws of the bad manners, hot temper, snobbery, or whatever—the disrespect of others' feelings—that was to be revealed in the newlywed.

There is still a third significant element in the notion of ?adat. It is normative; it includes the idea of "ought." A tribe's, family's, or individual's ?adat may be contrasted to its *tufu*?, another term which has the English sense of custom or habit. If a man wears a mustache, that is his *tufu*?. One who goes regularly at a certain time each morning to check his pig has developed a *tufu*? to do that. Some families have the *tufu*? to give or to ask working animals as part of a bride-price; other families have the *tufu*? not to; still others are indifferent to the question—they have no *tufu*? on that matter either way. The critical difference between *tufu*? and ?adat is that the latter has a normative content, whereas the former has none. A man's habits in the care of his pig or the wearing of a mustache are his own concern; a family may decide for itself whether it wishes to give or to ask carabaos. ?Adat is not involved in the custom, as it is not one which bears upon respect for other people; and no moral obligation is implied.

Of course, ?adat is certainly involved in how people deal with

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someone's particular tufu². The decision to wear a mustache is tufu²; not to make a derogatory comment about someone else's mustache is ²adat.

Bala²ud told a story about the importance of respecting the tufu². There was a family, whose tufu² was to ask carabaos as part of a brideprice. They were arranging a marriage between their daughter and the boy of a family whose tufu² was not to give animals. What happened was that they asked for one animal, and the boy's side gave one, but the girl's side immediately gave one kris, which they called a *teleb sogo*, 'to cover over the footprints,' which is to say, to hide the carabao's having been given. That way neither side was forced to break its tufu². The girl's side considered the carabao as part of the brideprice; the boy's side did not, but looked upon it as a gift. It was remembered, but not formally counted in their reckoning of the settlement. Several years later, the girl ran away with another man, and the brideprice had to be returned. A carabao was returned, of course, but it was called a *ruranan tamuk*, 'to carry the brideprice items.' Thus the woman's side considered that they returned the carabao, but the other side looked upon that animal as having merely borne their goods back to them. That is the way, Bala²ud said, we show ²adat; one must always observe the ²adat.

For Tiruray, then, the ²adat is not only (like tufu²) what they, as Tiruray, do and how they do it (their customs with regard to weddings, newcomers, labor exchange, and the like). It is also (unlike tufu²) what they ought to do and how they ought to do it. The ²adat sets standards of conduct; it places obligations—all of which are seen in terms of interpersonal respect.

As I have mentioned, an aspect of the Tiruray world view underlies this overwhelming concern for respectful behavior. Like that of all peoples, Tiruray culture sets forth a world in which everyone understands himself to live, a world whose nature is taken for granted.² Thus, to Tiruray there are certain "facts" about the nature

2. The term "world" is here understood in the phenomenological sense. For extended discussions of the world as one's phenomenal, taken-for-granted sphere of reality, see Schutz (1962) and Berger and Luckmann (1966).

of this world, about mankind, and about social life which they understand as being simply and self-evidently true. One such fact is that men are, by nature, potentially violent. Men are capable of exploding under provocation into a fury of bloodshed and vengeance. Why this should be so is not at issue here; to Tiruray it *is* so, and men *are* that way.

Furthermore, one is especially likely to burst into violence when outraged by a nonrelative; one is, by nature, less apt to feel hatred toward a kinsman in the first place and, if he should do so, is far more able to contain his inherent propensity to lash out violently. Thus it is a fact of life to Tiruray that the world of interfamilial social relations is one of danger, potential bloodshed, and continual risk and that amidst one's kinsmen there is mutual assistance and a context of relative safety. A father may attempt to give moral advice or a mild scolding to his son, but the world "being as it is," only a madman would scold a nonkinsman and incur the inevitable retaliatory consequences.

However much an anthropologist or a sociologist may demonstrate that other men in other lands do not understand human nature in this way, to the Tiruray themselves those propositions about the nature of man and society are simply true. They are objective realities of the Tiruray common-sense world. To behave in violation of their normative implications would not merely show bad taste, it would flout the fundamental canons of common sense so thoroughly as to suggest utter insanity.³

For Tiruray, as for the participants in any culturally given and shared world view, their taken-for-granted world is their paramount reality—the foundation of their everyday awareness and the matrix from which common sense is established as the natural attitude toward day-to-day affairs, that is, as the primary model for pragmatic action in the world.⁴ It is the peculiar function of common sense that it embraces the apparent givenness of the seemingly real in both its cognitive and normative aspects, and thereby sets forth a

3. The fundamental role of common sense has been profoundly analyzed by Schutz; see especially (1962:3-47).

4. The term "paramount reality" is from Schutz; see (1962:207 ff.). My discussion has been importantly influenced by Geertz; see especially (1958, 1964a, 1964b, 1966).

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model for prudent behavior in daily life—a model which is rooted both in that which “clearly is” and in that which “clearly ought to be.” The violent propensities of human nature, the security that prevails among kinsmen, and the perils of social intercourse outside one’s family are, to Tiruray common sense, not matters for speculation. They are cognitive facts. And, similarly, the conviction that only an appropriately related elder ought to engage in scolding someone—and then only with utmost care—is no mere rubric of etiquette but a normative fact, a moral truth proceeding from what Tiruray understand to be the very nature of man.

Thus, respect for others is the Tiruray’s most basic moral obligation—the essence of his tribal custom and the guiding intention of behavior felt to be most distinctively Tiruray. Thus, too, a world in which the sensitivities of all are respected by all is the society’s most compelling moral goal. Only such a social situation can be assessed as good, as right, as being “the way it should be”—as being, in the fundamentally important Tiruray concept which sums up all such ideas, *fiyo*.

A thing is *fiyo* when it is just the way it ought to be. A woman who has physical beauty according to Tiruray canons (light skin, shiny long black hair, thick ankles, a narrow waist) is, with regard to her appearance, *fiyo*. More generally, a woman, however plain, who works hard, who is kind, who is modest, who thus meets the more important and serious canons involved in judging female quality, is also *fiyo*. The weather is *fiyo* when it is clear so that one can do his work. A decision is *fiyo* when it is made with sensitivity and sense. One who has been sick is *fiyo* again upon recovery. A *fiyo* homemade shotgun is one that shoots regularly and accurately. A meal is *fiyo* if it tastes good and is filling. Ubiquitous in Tiruray discourse, the term can range over a vast number of connotations for which English has separate words, such as proper, delicious, attractive, adequate, convincing, right, and good. Its opposite, *tété?*—as commonly used and as widely applied as *fiyo*—denotes anything that is bad, wicked, ugly, defective, or, in sum, anything that is in an important way not as it should be, that is fundamentally, profoundly amiss, that is not *fiyo*.

The “good world” is one, then, in which as much as possible is

fiyo. Tiruray realize, of course, that there are limits and bounds to the human capacity to bring about the good and that not every aspect of existence can be always fiyo. Good weather is bound to alternate with bad. In a forest existence, there inevitably are times when the stomach is too empty and the muscles are too tired. They fully expect that death will inflict grief and that childbirth will bring pain. Life's hardships are beyond human control. But many misfortunes are not; they are believed to have a personal cause. People (whether humans or spirits) are apt to react with violence against anyone who injures them in body or in feelings. Thus in one vastly significant area of life, human behavior can and must be channeled. People must be obliged to respect each other's normally placid, but inherently dangerous, feelings. It is a basic premise of Tiruray common sense that only in a social order of mutual forbearance, a moral order laying upon both men and spirits the obligation of interpersonal respect, can one hope for even the most minimally fiyo world.

Much of the variety of day-to-day interpersonal contact can be structured by established tribal custom so that, in a straightforward manner, one can be respectful of his fellow's feelings by adherence to the customs. Much, but not all. Respect of each individual's feelings is the overriding goal of the ?adat, not merely scrupulous observance of tribal custom, however important the latter may seem as a means of achieving the moral goal. Thus ?adat (as respect) daily requires everyone to make decisions about right behavior in situations where the ?adat (as specific Tiruray custom) is silent. In these uncharted situations, the individual must determine for himself what course of action is morally right, what is ?adat for him at that moment and in that set of circumstances.

Respecting the feelings of others is characteristically spoken of in terms of not giving anyone a *tété? fedew*, literally, a 'bad gallbladder.' The notion of a person's *fedew* is utterly central to Tiruray moral and legal thought and must be considered with care.

The Tiruray word "fedew," like the English word "heart," on one level names an organ of the body, but, also like heart, *fedew* is widely extended to embrace a cluster of figurative, metaphorical meanings. The *fedew* in this extended sense is one's state of mind

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or rational feelings, one's condition of desiring or intending. Some examples may help to clarify the concept of fedew.

"What is your fedew?" asks of a person his specific desire, decision, or intention about a particular matter, as, "What is your fedew; will you go on Wednesday or Friday?" or "It is my fedew to sleep in Tagisa before proceeding."

"How does your fedew feel?" inquires into someone's mental reaction to an event and evokes such replies as, "My fedew is quite all right (fiyo)," meaning, "I am glad," "I am satisfied," "I don't mind," or "my fedew is very bad," which may indicate that the speaker is lonely or very sick and worried about his family or that he is hurt and angry because of some insult. This sense of the word appears in statements of necessary conditions for making one's fedew good again or in the gentle introduction of a kinsman to the offering of advice: "Don't have a bad fedew if I have something to tell you."

Feelings which are referred to the fedew are ones which involve active thinking—conscious mental processes. It is a mind at ease, free from disturbance, which is fiyo. In contrast, one which is distracted from its practical, day-to-day concerns and obsessed with thoughts of worry, fear, anger, hatred, and revenge is tété?, not as it should be, bad.

Two general kinds of bad fedew are distinguished, according to whether the cause was fate or the action of a person. The first, ?embuku? fedew, might be glossed as a 'painful' fedew. One is lonesome, sad, in grief, worried, or bothered with haunting envy. One feels ashamed, in the presence of someone else, of his poor house, or his embarrassing error. He feels vaguely suspicious that something is amiss, without knowing who or what is the cause. In such cases (each having its own descriptive, as *memala*, 'embarrassed'; ?embuku?, 'lonely,' 'grieving'; *melidu?*, 'worried'), the fedew is said to be generally ?embuku?, 'painful.' In such instances, although the person has a bad fedew, he does not feel anger or hatred or a drive toward vengeance. His painful fedew is caused by his fate in a difficult and uncertain world; it is bad, but it is not 'hurt'—the second kind of bad fedew—through the actions of some other person.

When a fedew is 'hurt' (*demawet fedew*), it is because the person feels that he has been abused in some way. However successful he may be in containing and controlling his rage, even in outwardly concealing it, that a person so injured will feel a deep moral outrage and hatred toward the one who wronged him and that he will inevitably wish revenge is never questioned.

We spoke for a while about shame. He told me that it is very different to be 'ashamed' (*memala*—really more like the English "embarrassed") and to be 'put to shame' (*fenmala*). "You can be ashamed without feeling hurt and angry, although it is very painful. But anyone who is put to shame will be very hurt and terribly angry. If a big shot came to our town, and perhaps was a relative—a distant cousin, say, who was a big shot now in the city—so he came to eat at my house, of course I would be ashamed because my house is very small, poor, very humble. My fedew would be bad. But I would do the best I could to receive him. We would butcher a chicken, and be sure and obtain some rice to eat. Then, if he were to refuse my food—perhaps even comment that he feared getting sick—I would also be very hurt, so my fedew would be bad in a much worse way. I would be put to shame and very hot with anger. Of course, especially if it is my relative, I would try to hold it, but I know I would want to hit him, or do something even worse."

An ordinary person cannot help feeling embarrassed at the rustic hospitality he can offer to a prestigious, renowned, or affluent visitor, but he can expect that his guest will not insult him or put him to public embarrassment. The latter would be a clear violation of moral principle and a radically different matter. His otherwise 'painful' fedew would then be 'hurt.' He might or might not show an immediate overt reaction, but his hurt fedew would certainly be angry, and it would cry out for revenge; it would harbor henceforth a deep grudge; it would be a hating fedew. Any act is wrong which either intentionally or imprudently leads to such a bad fedew.

A bad fedew is—simply—not *fiyo*; it is not "as it should be." The painful fedew and the hurt fedew differ essentially in their origins and therefore in their potential danger to social harmony

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and well-being. The one is caused by somebody and thus brings the bad fedew into a hating relationship with another person, a situation fraught, as Tiruray see it, with danger and violence. Painful feelings are part of the unavoidable ups and downs of life. There is much that one can do through religious belief and ritual to live with them and to render them meaningful, but little that one can do to avoid them. In contrast, a bad fedew caused by human foolishness can and ought to be avoided. It is this "ought" which is conceived to be the rationale for, the meaning and end of, the customs (?adat). It defines respect—one ought never cause a bad fedew—and thus permits substance to be given to that most fundamental principle of Tiruray moral thought.

My traveling companion (a graduate of the agricultural high school, more given, perhaps to systematic thought than most) and I chatted at length along the way about *ke²ali²*, 'exercising care not to cause anyone a bad fedew.' As he saw it, there are three main things to respect: a person's belongings (*?entiṅay-en*), his standing (*tindeg*), and his feelings as such (*fedew*). Disrespect of any of these, he felt, is what incites a bad fedew.

A person's *?entiṅayen*, his 'belongings' or 'possessions,' is all that is his, all of which he is *géfé²*. To be *géfé²* of something is to have exclusive rights over its present use. In peasantized areas, the actual owner, holding title to a tract of land, is the *géfé²* of the land; but, if he has a tenant to whom he has assigned his land to work, his tenant is the *géfé²* of the plowed field which he is working. Traditional Tiruray have no concept of permanent land ownership, but the man who cuts a particular swidden is its *géfé²* and the "owner" of all that is grown upon it. When it returns to fallow, he continues to be its *géfé²* in that, once sufficient secondary forest has been re-established for the plot to be farmed again, no one may cut that area without asking him to release his rights. A man is the *géfé²* of his own house, of his wife, of his work animals, of whatever property is his at any given time, of a wedding that he is celebrating for his daughter, of a legal proceeding that concerns his hurt fedew, in short, of any object, person, or event in which he has not only an economic and emotional interest, but a personal, legitimate over-

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sight. Such things (his clothing, his family, his rituals, his property, his fields) are his for so long as his rights over them continue; they are collectively his *ʔentiṇayen*, and he is the *géféʔ* of each and of all. And, my companion urged, one cannot respect the person without respecting those rights.

Stealing (*menakaw*) is very bad and will surely cause a bad *fedew*. Getting property is hard; and what's yours is yours. It should not be taken. You take someone's property without his permission and without giving him anything—he will surely be very hot. How can people live together who do that? Rice and corn will not just grow unless they are planted. Things are owned. The *géféʔ* is the *géféʔ*. If you really need something or need help, just ask. Tiruray are kind; they will share. But if you take without asking, you don't respect the person. You lower his standing. He will be terribly angry.

Not respecting one's belongings thus touches another of the suggested danger areas, one's *tindeg*, 'standing.' The following situations all involve the notion of standing:

There was much discussion about a religious leader from a community just over the mountains to the northeast. It seems that he called for all of his followers to gather together, and a large number did not come. They say he has a very bad *fedew* to those who did not come, since they did not respect his standing. Even though he is not doing anything, he is very hating. He will keep it in mind, and if they continue to act that way he will not help them when they need him.

We had gone several kilometers along extremely mucky trails, when we came to a house, and stopped to take a drink of water. The owner asked us to come up, and I was about to do so—without thinking about the mud all over my shoes—when (my companion on the hike) stopped me gently and pointed to my feet. I removed my shoes. Later, I asked him about it, and he explained that among Tiruray to enter someone's house with muddy feet is against the customs; it is as though his house is the home of a pig rather than a person, as though

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you think of him as not caring for his home; it would lower his standing.

He said the rape not only lowered his daughter's standing and put her to shame, but also his own and his whole family's standing; if the man wanted his daughter, he should have told his old folks and they could have come and arranged for a marriage in the right way.

A man's standing is, in a broad sense, his social position. It includes his relative age and authority, his relative dignity and honor, his social esteem. Everyone has his standing. Families or individuals have "higher" or "lower" standing, in the sense of their general reputations; a son who does foolish things is said to lower the standing of his family, by acting in a way more base than his relatives and forefathers have been known to act. But, in another sense, a person's standing is his (or her) "good name"—his personal, individual honor and standing among his fellows. And everyone has a right to having his standing treated with respect. However humble one's family, each person has his own good name and his right to it. He can lower his own standing—can sully his own good name—by his own actions, but he will be deeply offended if anyone else should do that to him.

The idea of standing is clearly manifested in the distinction between the Tiruray concepts of despising and of correcting or advising.

Because of the harvest, Benito (a brother of one of the wives in Figel neighborhood) and Teṇaṇa (their first cousin) were in Figel for a few days. Benito kept complaining that Teṇaṇa was lacking in dignity. He was saying that whenever there was a gathering Teṇaṇa did not sit formally but was always darting around. He gave as his opinion that when a fellow is ugly, he should at least have dignity. When these words reached Teṇaṇa, he became furious at his cousin. He went up to him and demanded, "Why do you talk about me, despising me? I will give you a good beating for your lies about me." Benito replied, "Come on and see if you can—besides it is all true—you are ugly and you are a fool." So they began to fight.

When he learned what was going on, their uncle (a considerably older man) ran over and separated them. He told them to sit down where they were, and he asked them what happened. Once they were a bit cooler, he called them aside and told them privately that both were foolish. He told Tejaña that he too felt that he did not show much dignity in his blatant lack of formality; he then told Benito that he was hardly showing dignity himself in publicly despising his cousin. He advised them both that if they wanted to fight each other they should go ahead *inside* his house, among their own kin—who could see how foolish they were without having to suffer public shame—but that outside the house they had better act more sensibly, or they would end up offending some nonrelative and then would be in real trouble.

I asked the uncle, when he later described to me how he had corrected his nephews, whether they would not feel that he was despising them. He replied, "An elder close relative may give a person advice, warnings, scoldings—he can be quite frank—he has the right to do that; he has the standing. But, otherwise, to say such things to a person would be to despise him and would surely cause him a bad fedew. For example, if you were to tell me that you did not like my clothes (he was wearing the traditional Tiruray dress), it would be very bad. A person may wear what he likes to wear. You would be despising me, and I would have a very bad fedew. If you said that thing in front of others and despised me publicly, it would be far worse. My fedew would not only be hurt, but shamed."

I asked whether a person would be hurt if it was his father who criticized his manner of dress. "No, not if he told him in a nice way. That would be correcting, not despising. Even if the person disagreed with his father, he would not feel that he was hating him, but only trying to give him good advice." I then wondered what would happen if a close friend tried to offer some good advice. He looked surprised at the question. "No one would ever do that. Only relatives who are older give you advice. We never try to advise nonrelatives; we have no standing to do that. It would most certainly be considered despising." Could a nephew ever advise his uncle, for example, not

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to gamble? Continued curious surprise at such naïve questions: "No, no. He could never do that. The uncle would feel that his nephew did not respect his standing and would be very hurt. It is against our custom."

Several terms used in advising or scolding display the great concern for respect and the fear about the consequences of disrespect. One who is insensitive to the feelings of others is said to be not *semegafa*², and elders tell children frequently that if they are not *semegafa*² they will be hated, they will find themselves in danger, they will cause great trouble for everyone. A person who does as he pleases without *any* thought for the feelings of others is called *lemigisligis*, and it is said that a true *lemigisligis* seldom lives to grow old. He ignores his acts of disrespect, so his acts are foolhardy; they should make him ashamed and worried, but they actually leave him unconcerned. They do not lead him to learn proper behavior, to make sensible, decent estimates of his moral obligations in the situations of daily life. Such estimates are difficult enough for the earnest person; one who ignores signs and clues that might help is either utterly foolish or mad.

An individual's estimate of a situation is the *karaŋ* of his *fedew*. He can have a *karaŋ* of whether it will rain or whether it is a good day to hunt pigs. One's estimate is, of course, crucial to his effort to behave morally. Many judgments must be made concerning a situation—what is required, what is reasonable, what will hurt, and so forth. It is the *fedew* which, in reaching its estimate of a situation, takes a position regarding moral obligation and the demands of respect.

My traveling companion's assessment of the general areas of moral tenderness—one's property, his self-esteem, and his social position—is no formal analysis; his categories are certainly not exclusive (to steal one's wife is also to hurt his feelings and to lower his standing), nor, probably, are they exhaustive. But if he is not a systematic philosopher, he is a morally earnest person faced with the daily problem of specifying in particular instances what is involved in respect. His categories do indicate, more than does the notion of *fedew* alone, how one proceeds to behave respectfully in

order not to cause a bad fedew. One applies a set of ideas—ideas which to Tiruray seem sheer common sense, simply features of the way things are—of what constitutes a good fedew and of what is apt to turn it bad. One employs his general knowledge of the sorts of sensitivity to which any fedew is given and looks for specific clues to understand any particular sensitivities of the particular fedew with which he is confronted.

Communication of such clues—both sending and receiving the signals—is critically important, and a vast array of concepts in Tiruray thought are employed for this. Of the myriad, a few examples from two classes may be taken as typical. Both are classes of noun forms derived from adjectives which specify something—an object, a person, a situation—in which a specific fedew is deeply involved emotionally. Each, by setting forth some piece of public information about that fedew, serves to identify its claims upon or sensitivities regarding respect.

The first set of terms signals that someone is probably holding in strong and explosive desires; that he should be “handled with care” because his fedew is already in some internal turmoil and less than usually able to contain any subsequent pressure. Moreover, they identify the focus of the engaged fedew and warn that for the person in question it too must be treated with prudent care. Something which is causing a person profound envy, for example, is said by that person to be his ‘envy object,’ the *ke?iqaran* of his fedew. Similarly, there are terms for that which is filling a fedew with thoughts of hatred (the *kerarekon* fedew) or which has brought someone close to the end of his patience, has rendered him “fed up” (the *kesemunon* fedew), or is the object of his serious suspicions or jealousy (the *kedalewon* fedew). These concepts provide plain public warnings about a given fedew in a given set of circumstances.

Another class of fedew-signals serves to publish an individual's claims to reasonable and specific respect from his fellows for particular concerns of his own. A plan of action that a person is known to have, some intention to do something, is said to be the *bantak* of his fedew. The intellect (*?itungen*) considers the plan, thinks through the details. It is, however, the fedew which feels commit-

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ment to it, and others ought to give reasonable respect to a person's plans and not complicate or obstruct them needlessly. A *bantak* is, therefore, publicly known information about a *fedew*'s engagement. If you know that a man's *fedew* has a certain intention, you know something substantive about respecting that man; not causing him a bad *fedew* is given content in terms of respect for his plan of action. Conversely, of course, failure to respect his plans is specified and identified as a failure to respect his *fedew*.

Similarly, a *ke'ika'an* of someone's *fedew* is its known personal aversion, something that the individual really dislikes. Not all persons have the same aversion, nor do all have the same quantity of personal dislikes. One fellow's personal aversions may include a whole roster of relatively minor "pet peeves"; another's may be some single, intensely felt hatred. Whatever and however many the known *ke'ika'an* of an individual, those who deal with him socially are extremely careful about them, lest they set off a bad *fedew*.

The same is true about a known *ketayan*, that which a *fedew* especially likes or desires. In general, Tiruray feel morally obliged to grant people respect for their purely individual tastes and idiosyncrasies, where they are within reasonable limits. Of course, an aversion that was utterly disruptive of normal social expectations, such as a dislike for meeting one's reciprocal labor obligations, or an equivalent personal wish, such as a desire for another man's wife, would hardly be considered by one's companions to create moral obligation. But it is also true that no one would seriously and publicly present such an outlandish suggestion as the aversion or the desire of his *fedew*. Both in asserting their own *fedew* and in attending to others', Tiruray are common participants in a general cultural consensus concerning the reasonable and sensible limits of personal demands.

The precise boundaries of reason and good sense in any given concrete situation are, however, an inevitable source of difficulty. Despite acute efforts to be morally sensitive, situations often do arise in which there can be honest and deeply felt differences of opinion about whether a particular personal plan of action has been given its due respect, whether someone's desire is beyond the

limits of propriety, or the extent to which an individual's peculiar antipathy should morally obligate his neighbors to suffer sustained inconvenience.

Some guidance is provided by folk stories, such as this humorous episode in the escapades of Inoterigo, a marvelous female of "long ago":

When Inoterigo wanted to catch some nice fish for her supper, she would go to the mouth of the river and, plugging her anus with an egg, would drink up all the water. When the river bed was dry, she could easily fill her basket with fish. Then she would vomit back the water and go home. One day, when she was fishing in this manner and had drunk up all the water from the river, a young man named Tibugel happened to pass by. He asked Inoterigo for some of her fish—because she had gotten them all—but she would not give him any, saying that it was her fedew's dislike (*ke'ika'an*) to share any of her catch. So Tibugel went home. At his house, he had a pet wild rooster, which he dispatched to the river. The rooster found Inoterigo bent over, picking up fish from the river bed, and pecked the egg in her anus. The egg broke and the water all rushed out of Inoterigo. The rooster ran home to Tibugel. Inoterigo repented her foolishness and from then on would always share her fish.

Tibugel had rejected Inoterigo's personal aversion as unreasonable; she had recognized the justice of his effective, if whimsical, rebuke. The story and others like it can make the point that there are limits beyond which moral obligation is not established; but it cannot spell out for specific cases precisely what those limits are.

The 'dislike,' the 'plan,' and the 'desire' are examples of a large class of concepts which publish the presumably reasonable demands of a particular fedew in a particular situation. A fedew may also have that for which it is profoundly craving, for which it is longing. It may have its overriding concern, its absolute first priority. All such ideas give, in an overt and accessible manner, meaning and content to the general moral imperative to respect one's fellows, to avoid causing anyone a bad fedew. Concepts of this sort are necessary: tribal custom can organize vast amounts, but not all, of in-

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terpersonal behavior. And they are effective: in most cases, most of the time, claims to respect so published are felt to be well within bounds and to constitute binding moral obligations. But it is also true that in some cases, some of the time, they necessarily raise the question "at the boundary" of what is reasonable respect and what are unreasonable demands.

The Tiruray sense of moral obligation to respect each other's *fedew* underlies and finds expression in a normative terminology, words which might be glossed as 'right,' 'good,' 'rights,' 'fault,' 'wrong,' 'bad,' 'transgressor,' 'wrongdoer,' all of which have within their meanings a characteristic sense of *ought*—required, observed, or violated. The *ʔarus* way to do something, for example, is the best way to do it, in the sense of the most expedient, straightforward way; the *fatut* way to do it is the morally proper way, the way that is good (*fiyo*), that is in keeping with custom (*ʔadat*), the way that will not hurt anyone's *fedew*. A course of action may well be recommended as both *ʔarus* (the most practical) and *fatut* (the decent) approach, but the two evaluations are not the same. If a theft were planned and carried out with logic, finesse, and success, the thief might well be credited with having done his wrong in an *ʔarus* way. But it would not have been *fatut*; stealing is wrong, however elegantly done, and the victim will have a thoroughly outraged bad *fedew*. The former is devoid of normative content; the latter specifically applies it.

A person whose actions have caused a bad *fedew* is said to be *dufaŋ*, the fundamental pejorative in moral evaluation. In its various linguistic forms, the term may mean the one who makes the trouble, the wrong act itself, the doing of it, or the one against whom it is done. But in each instance the word specifies a situation in which someone has violated his moral obligation to respect another, he has caused a hurt *fedew*, he has done wrong. By definition and by the whole logic of Tiruray morality, *dufaŋ* is serious and dangerous. Acculturated English-speaking Tiruray translate it as 'foolish,' but the gloss is too mild unless understood in the sense of being utterly reckless. To act 'foolishly' is to enrage a *fedew*. It is, thus, certainly to upset normal social relations, and it is very possible to incur violent, bloody turmoil for oneself and for society.

Whenever one must in the course of normal activities do something which *could* imply disrespect, like walking in front of someone, passing between two people, or interrupting a conversation, custom and respect (?adat) call for the expression *tabiya?*, which, rather like "excuse me," signals that no disrespect is intended.

He warned me about hiking along the river—one must be careful not to offend. "You may pass where a woman is bathing. If she sees you coming and knows that there is no other trail, she will take cover and not be hurt. But, it may be that she is facing the other way and cannot see your coming; you should call out, 'Tabiya?', you will be seen!' Then she can cover herself. If you happen to see a naked woman—for example, if you happen upon her unexpectedly when crossing a river—you must be quick to say, 'You were seen; tabiya?!' If you do not say that, she will think that you were intentionally peeping. Once you say that, even though she will be embarrassed that her body was seen, she will not be angry at you because she will know that it was an accident and that you did not *dufaŋ* her."

To *dufaŋ* is to act either with intention to do wrong or with excessive imprudence. If a group of men are working together slashing a swidden site, and the bolo blade of one breaks, flies, and cuts the flesh of a companion, there is no bad *fedew*. Although by custom the one who caused blood to flow will give his injured associate a token gift, he was not 'foolish'; there was no intention to cause harm. If a woman was forced into having extramarital sexual intercourse, she did not *dufaŋ* her husband, although her abuser certainly did. Should a man pick up someone else's property by mistake and return it, there is no 'foolishness' because no intention to steal.

The issue here is whether the act is intentional or not; it is not whether the person doing it expects to be caught:

Mo?ilag and Mobayaw (two legal leaders) were chatting in Mo?ilag's house one morning, where they were awaiting Motineŋka, who was expected to arrive sometime that day to ask to marry ?Ideŋ Surut, the divorced daughter of Mobayaw. Their conversation turned to how ugly they felt. Motineŋ-

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ka to be, since his teeth were not kept properly blackened, but were merely yellow from betel chewing. Laughingly, they compared his teeth and general appearance to that of the man-eating giant, the *busaw*. Unfortunately, at that moment, Motineŋka happened by the house, and overheard what the two men were saying. He was extremely angry, and entering the house with his spear high as though ready to thrust, he confronted the two men and growled that he may have yellow teeth, but has not yet eaten any human being. He accused them of despising him and asked them to judge themselves. They immediately accepted their fault and placed sixty plates and two crises before Motineŋka, to restore his good fedew. With that, he cooled off and lowered his spear; soon afterwards he returned to his own place, and he sought a wife elsewhere.

Even where there is no intention to hurt, a reasonable exercise of prudence is required by *ʔadat*, and carelessness which runs one afoul of someone's feelings is also culpable.

On arrival at Figel (after having been away for over a week), I learned that Mosew had a very bad fedew toward a youth from Tuwol. The young man had been here overnight and had been showing around his newly acquired homemade shotgun. To demonstrate the gun, he fired once into the bushes to the east of the settlement. It was dusk, and already quite dark, and he did not see Mosew walking nearby. Mosew said he was badly frightened by the nearness of the report and was almost hit by the flying pellets. He had been really upset, and, although the boy from Tuwol had earnestly insisted that he did not realize anyone was there, Mosew says that he cannot forget such foolishness.

(Several days later) *ʔUdoy*, a kefeduwan from Tuwol, came and said that the foolishness had not been intentional but that he agreed that Mosew had the right to ask whatever he wished. Mosew said that he had been genuinely outraged by the youth's foolishness, but that he would ask only one spear.

Whenever an offense occurs and a fedew is made bad, the matter of *salaʔ* (fault or responsibility) and the matter of *benal* (under-

standable demands for retaliation, for acceptable compensation) are immediately raised. A person is *mensala*?, he 'has the fault' or 'bears the responsibility' when a fedew is made bad by his 'foolish' behavior. If the one who has been hurt is a close relative, he may be expected under ordinary circumstances to hold his feelings in check until his anger toward his kinsman subsides or until an elder can correct the errant one. But, if the one hurt is not a close blood relative and his fedew was made angry, he cannot be expected to do nothing. He is hurt; his fedew hates and craves revenge, and that craving for revenge and retaliation is, to Tiruray, "human nature" and understandable. Given the hurt he has been forced to endure, it is his inevitable and natural inclination to seek redress; this is his *benal*. That he can be expected to strike out in vengeance against the person who committed the foolishness against him is simply and, to Tiruray common sense, obviously the consequence of 'foolish' (*dufaŋ*) behavior. However dislocating it is to the general social order, and however dangerous it may be for all his relatives, the individual 'foolish' enough to hurt a fedew cannot expect that suffering will not follow. He is the *mensala*?; his victim has his *benal*.

I asked whether the *to^oow bé^één* (a particularly poisonous jungle snake) was considered 'cruel' (*mediyabu*), and was told a fascinating bit of "Tiruray history." The *to^oow bé^één* was the very first of all the snakes and was born to a Tiruray father and mother, twin to a baby boy. The boy and his snake brother always played together, and they slept on the same mat in the house. One day the boy fell dead, but the snake cured him by getting grasses and rubbing his body. The father, however, was worried and told the snake, "You had better separate from your twin; you are a snake, and the houses are for humans. The proper place for snakes is in the forest." So the boy and the snake made an agreement, promising never to harm each other as they were of the same blood. Henceforth, they would live each in his own place, and neither would go to the house of the other. A human might always go through the forest, and the *to^oow bé^één* will not kill him, unless he steps upon his nest; similarly, the human will not kill the snake, unless the *to^oow bé^één* should break the agreement and come to the house

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of the human. Of course, if either trespasses their agreement—if the human steps on the snake's nest in the forest, or if the snake is found in someone's home—then the trespasser clearly has the fault (*sala?*), and the other will as clearly have the benal to kill him. Thus, to this day, on the whole, people and this variety of venomous snake leave each other alone. When the snake is 'foolish' (*dufaŋ*) enough to come where he should not be, of course, the people try to kill him. Similarly, when a human is bitten by that snake in the forest, you know that it is not because the snake was cruel—but because he had the benal. The *to?ow bé?én* would not kill anyone who did not break the agreement. It is not cruel to attack someone who has offended you. The *busaw* are the cruel ones—because they will eat you, even though you did nothing to offend them. They attack you without benal.

One evening, one of the older men of Ranao spent some time with me out under the stars, explaining and telling stories about the constellations which he saw in the night sky. It was a beautiful, warm night, and the talk drifted from one subject to another, finally settling on difficulties that arise among neighbors and how they should be handled so that they would not lead to serious trouble.

"My cousin and I were once living very near each other," he told me, "and quite far from the spring where we were getting our water. So our wives and daughters had to carry water a great distance every day. My cousin's wife fell into the habit of just getting water at our house, rather than carrying it all the way from the spring. She did not do it every time, of course, but still much too often. Pretty soon my wife had a bad *fedew* to her cousin-in-law, and although she held her anger in her *fedew*, she complained bitterly to me that my cousin's wife was not respecting what was ours. I planned to speak to my cousin and urge him to provide his own house with water, so that our wives would not fight; this is what happens when wives are not related—they easily quarrel. But when I went to see my cousin, I did not have the courage to bring out my advice, so we only talked about hunting. I went to see him another time, but still could not bring this out, for fear that he

might be resentful of my words. So I went to see our uncle, who lived fairly nearby, and I told him my problem. He agreed that my wife might not be able to hold it much longer, and promised to speak to my cousin. Things did not change, though, so we built a different house farther away from my cousin's house and there was no further trouble."

It sometimes happens that a person is very ready to call for help with his field, but when asked to reciprocate always seems to have something else to do. People will soon have a bad *fedew* to that person. They will just hold it and not do or say anything directly to him, although they will certainly talk about what he does when he is not around. At first, everyone may help him all the more—to emphasize what is right; then they will just stop helping him. They will hold on to their anger, because he is their *dumon*, 'relative,' 'neighbor'; but when he calls them for help they will all say that they have other things to do.

'Holding'—literally, 'able to hold steady'—(*getin̄kel*) is one possible response of a bad *fedew* toward the one at fault. As in the two instances above, to hold is the characteristic response to *dufañ* behavior among close relatives. To a somewhat less predictable extent, it may be expected among nonkinsmen neighbors who are close day-to-day associates. In general, a cool restraint of those violent, vengeful urges considered so natural to hurt *fedew* is thought to be as clearly worthy of praise as it is difficult of achievement. Anger is conceived as engulfing the *fedew* in a rising crest of hatred. It can be contained to a point. Then it will break forth in *benal*, in desire for vengeance. There is an obligation to hold anger at petty irritations, but Tiruray believe that beyond a certain point it is only a morally heroic *fedew* which might be capable of bearing the resentment and hatred. Everyone should hold himself as much as possible. People should not just get hot right away whenever they are displeased, especially with close relatives. But there are limits; some things are just too much, and anger is bound to come out. Here, as with such ideas as the aversion of the *fedew*, the central point is quite clear—people deserve reasonable respect for their aversions;

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they are also expected to bear a reasonable amount of annoyance. But the matter of how much is too much, of where the boundaries of reason and sense lie, is inevitably problematic. That people *can* hold only so much is an empirical observation without normative content; that they *should* hold on to their rage to a certain extent, and that no one *should* push anyone else past that point, is an entirely normative matter. Judging what constitutes that reasonable extent is a profoundly sensitive operation.

The violence which is so feared is, indeed, another possible reaction to being morally abused. A bad fedew, pushed beyond its capacity to hold, will have the understandable bent to see vindication of its honor, and it may very well go looking for blood revenge. Such killing because of moral outrage, *bono*², is strictly distinguished from murder, *lifut*, which is killing without any such reason. *Bono*² is feared and considered wrong, but it is recognized as a dangerous possibility, a potential explosion of moral outrage in search of retaliation. One can only hold so much before his self-esteem and his standing require some vindication. Should a foolish person lower a man's standing—should he challenge his very manhood, for example, by making love to his wife—he has, in a sense, called that man's standing into public question. Were the man to do nothing in return, he would accept that lower standing. A bad fedew wants to purge the pain, assuage the anger, and seek vindication. One such way—extreme and wrong to Tiruray, but completely understandable to them—is to kill.

Sigayan, speaking of Awang Tiruray custom as he knew it in the mid-nineteenth century, gives this description of revenge killing:

Now the way they kill, if there is somebody with whom they are angry or against whom they have a grudge, is this: they go after revenge. When it is still daytime, they set out hiking to the place of the one they hate. Then, when they are at that place, and it is night, they shoot him with their bow and arrow, or else they might spear him as he sleeps. The revengers hide, for they do this killing with stealth. Once they have killed, they move away a bit—but they do not proceed home. They stay near the one whom they stabbed, in order to make sure from the sounds in the house whether the man died or not. When

they hear someone shout out "Who stabbed?" they, still being close by, will reply, "We did; we came on behalf of . . . , our friend." After that the killers go home, for they are satisfied.⁵

Mo²ensay, an elderly kefeduwan now living beyond the Tran in the Basak homesteading area who frequently returns to his old haunts near Figel and the traditional tribal atmosphere which he finds vastly more congenial, told me this story, so similar in detail to Sigayan's:

He said that before the coming of the Japanese [the great chronological bench mark of recent times, he probably means the thirties, but possibly the twenties] his aunt, ²Amuŋ, was caught by her husband, Liwas, having sexual intercourse with Samberan, a cousin of Liwas. The infuriated husband lunged at them with his field knife, but there was much scrambling about and confusion, and the illicit lovers were able to run away. Liwas reported what had happened to his uncle, who was an important kefeduwan and the leader of his family and who was known by the title Datu Kafitan. He sent messengers at once to call for the principal elders closely related to ²Amuŋ, two kefeduwan, named Minted and Masela². They arrived within several hours, and asked to settle the case nicely—agreeing that ²Amuŋ had the sala² (the fault of Samberan, at this point, not being their concern) and offering to return the entire brideprice. Datu Kafitan could not locate Liwas, however. Later that night, four men—Liwas and three relatives—appeared at the place of ²Amuŋ's parents and, with a bolo, repeatedly stabbed ²Amuŋ's father through the slat floor of his elevated house. He was dead within a few hours. In the morning, when Masela² and Minted arrived, and when they learned that Liwas had taken blood revenge for his bad fedew, they called together all of the close kinsmen of ²Amuŋ's father. Some were told to proceed with the burial, but most prepared to revenge his death. The same day a large group left to bono².

5. Tenorio (1892:33,34). The translation is mine and is taken from the Tiruray text. Bennisar's Spanish translation is not always faithful to the original and must be used with caution.

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That night they slept by the river, near the settlement of Liwas, and early in the morning they ambushed Bilu[?] and Buluntu[?], two first cousins of Liwas, who had gone to gather bamboo. Both were killed. Datu Kafitan called for Masela[?] and Minted to come and adjudicate the matter before there was more loss of life, and it was settled without any further killing.

Another well remembered example:

He [a middle-aged man] said that his grandfather had gone to bono[?] as a young man, when his older brother's wife had eloped with a man from beyond Bantek [in the mountains about 15 kilometers south of Upi]. His grandfather's brother was very hot and called his relatives together, saying that they should go at once to seek blood revenge. A large group went to the place of the eloper, where they killed five of his close relatives. Nothing more happened for over a year, and then the men of that place came and killed almost twenty of his grandparent's kindred.

Several salient features of revenge killing appear in these accounts which contribute to its bloody and disruptive character and therefore to the general fear in which it is held in this society. Bono[?] is usually by stealth, striking without warning, which necessitates an extreme and often long-lasting vigilance. It spreads beyond the exact individuals involved in the original 'foolish' act to endanger entire kindreds, and it rapidly escalates from a single act of revenge into a widening and self-perpetuating feud.

Tales tell of fabulously brave *ʔalek*, 'heroes,' who, fearing no man, would seek revenge openly. Instead of stabbing his opponent through the floor of his house or falling upon him by ambush, a 'hero' would place two stakes along a trail he knew the opponent would pass, marking off an area in which they would fight. Seeing this warning, the person could draw his kris and prepare to defend himself before entering the area. When fully ready to fight, he would spring into the marked-off stretch of trail, shouting "Who is challenging me?" at which time the revenger would come from his hiding place. This way of challenging openly is called 'cutting short

one's hiding' (*kemereb fera²a²*) and is said to be rare—characteristic of heroes but not of ordinary men and ordinary revenge. Usually, as in the stories told above, the revenge is 'hidden' (*mono² senirun*) and thus is an effective leveler—the famous fighter is no more frightening when he seeks revenge than is any other man. So long as there is the possibility that someone may have a hating fedew toward an individual, the individual must fear the sudden arrows from along the path, a sudden spear thrust through the floor when he is asleep, the blast of a homemade shotgun fired from concealment. Sharpened spurs of bamboo must be set into the ground all around the home. Watchfulness and care must be constant; life is reduced to siege.

Not only is the offender himself thrown into danger and fear, but anyone in his entire kindred is apt to be killed in revenge for what he did. The responsibility (*sala²*) is borne by all close relatives of the actual one responsible (the *mensala²*) for the bad fedew. One of the most immediate and most vexed rebukes that an offending individual can expect from his elders is that he has placed his relatives in grave danger. From the time the wrong is committed until it is settled by successful adjudication, there is anxiety among all the close kinsmen. Similarly, any close relative of the one hurt and craving vindication is likely to share in his sense of pain and benal and may well join him in a revenge killing raid.

Killing in revenge leads to further killing in counterrevenge. However human and understandable it may be in the Tiruray scheme, it is still wrong to them; it causes bad fedew, and it establishes new threats. Even though the one killed in revenge may have precipitated his own death by foolishly hurting someone's fedew—even though he clearly had the fault (*sala²*)—still his relatives will be expected to avenge him. Thus vengeance turns into feuding, not only extending outward to include the full kindreds of each person involved, but perpetuating itself forward in time as each killing to satisfy honor creates a new expectation for killing in return.

The explosion of a hurt fedew into *bono²* may be instantaneous if the offender is at hand, as when Liwas found his wife *Amun* in the act of cuckolding him with Samberan and (albeit unsuccessfully) tried to stab them both on the spot.

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I caught a ride with the mayor in his jeep and learned of a bono² killing that had occurred a few weeks ago in Mangga. The son of Moŋgo² of that place had run away with the wife of Serumfoŋ of Benuan, near Kuya. The trouble was settled by adjudication, but Moŋgo² did not send the peace offering when he was supposed to, so Serumfoŋ went to his house to get it. While they were eating, Moŋgo² began to grossly insult Serumfoŋ who is a short fellow with only stumps of fingers on one hand as a result of leprosy years ago. Moŋgo² said that he was deformed and small, that he doubted that he need even bother giving such a cripple a peace offering, that he doubted that he could kill if he wanted to. Serumfoŋ said nothing, but continued eating and tried to hold his anger. Moŋgo² got a homemade shotgun and rudely threw it at Serumfoŋ saying, "Here, here is your peace offering." Serumfoŋ apparently ignored the taunt and just placed the gun on his lap and went on eating. Unseen, however, he slipped in a shell, and when Moŋgo² insulted him again he shot him, blowing him to bits with a 12-gauge shell at close range. Then he ran away, and turned himself in to the mayor at Nuro. The mayor said that he had called for the relatives from both sides and had been promised that the matter would be settled without further bloodshed. Moŋgo²'s brother (an important kefeduwan) had investigated the situation and had accepted that his brother had been gravely at fault; he had agreed to settle the matter to the satisfaction of all by way of tiyawan.

In this case, bono² had not drawn the kindred of the one upon whom vengeance had been taken into counterrevenge and feuding; rather, cooler heads had prevailed, and the issues involved had been submitted to adjudication. This is the third of the major responses to a hurt fedew, and the moral response to a desire for retaliation (benal). If one cannot hold until the anger seeps away, but feels that his fedew must have some acceptable recompense for what it has suffered, he should still settle the issue in the fatut way—he should inform the kefeduwan, so that in tiyawan they might decide the fault (sala²) and the proper restitution (benal) officially, assess the appropriate fines, and thus restore his good fedew. Formal adjudication, tiyawan, is a deeply serious matter and the context of

the distinctive form of leadership among the Tiruray. Just as morality is the society's primary defense against the ravages of a bad fedew, so tiyawan are the final line of defense against the outbreak of violence.

Tiruray moral ideas define what, for them, is good, and they guide behavior that, for them, is right. Similarly, they define what is bad and identify conduct that is wrong and 'foolish.' They establish an ultimate moral standard—respect—and they tie it to a pervasive moral symbol, the fedew. They set forth the responsibility of the wrongdoer for the consequences of his disrespect, stressing that human nature is such that the consequences could be bloody, indeed. They institutionalize the obligation of respect into specific customs and into a general, variable standard: the *'adat*, in both of its senses. It is in terms of these ideas that the Tiruray attempts to behave in a respectful and responsible manner.

All of this seeks to work out in practice the normative aspects of Tiruray common sense, which constitute the imperatives of Tiruray morality. Throughout, however, it is clear that this moral code suffers from the limitations which are generic to moral systems.

The first inherent difficulty of moral systems derives from the diffuse sources of the social pressure which support moral obligations and render them difficult and inefficient to maintain.⁶ A system of straightforward moral imperatives and prescriptions making up the oughts for social life is, by itself, poorly equipped to deal with real or supposed breaches of the standards. For example, a person ought not to steal the rice from your granary, and yet you return home to find that someone has helped himself. What follows? Is it now proper for you to steal some rice back from the one you know—or think you know—did it? Suppose the individual you "know" to have done it denies that he did; how do you know that you know? Granted some clear moral obligation (not to steal) and granted some clear violation (something was stolen), the inefficiency problem inherent in any moral system is that collective morality, individually applied, cannot establish with authority either

6. This discussion of the difficulties inherent in the operation of a morality derives from Hart's analysis of the "defects" in any regime of primary rules alone. See Hart (1961:89 ff.).

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what happened or what should be done. Such pressing issues as determination of the offender, of the punishment due him, of how it should be administered, of the satisfaction due the offended, and of how it should be claimed are left to the individuals involved and whatever support they can muster to their points of view. Suppose someone does not respect his companion's personal aversion (his *ke?ika?an*), perhaps by foolishly mentioning the name of some individual for whom his companion has a deep hatred. What precisely is the proper satisfaction of his angered companion's *fedew*? Surely this is not sufficient grounds for a bloody feud. Morality recognizes a desire for restitution, that is, it recognizes *benal*; but *benal* to do what?

A second generic difficulty in moral systems springs from the general nature of moral obligations. They are not specific to certain individuals in certain situations, but rather refer to classes of acts and classes of persons; their application necessarily requires that specific cases be identifiable as particular instances of general classes. Sometimes this is quite simple. A thief, sneaking in from another village with intent to rob a granary, looking furtively about, selecting a dark night when the owner is away, and so forth, is an instance of stealing, a plain and clear case of the general concept. But, along with a core of settled meaning, there is in every general concept a more blurred, fuzzy edge where some of the features of the classic core case are present but others are either not there or are different. You were gone, and someone took the grain without asking because he needed it right then; he had planned to ask you, had you been home. Did he steal it or did he borrow it? The issue here is not the same as in the first case discussed. It is not "Is *X* the one who stole?" or "What should be done with *X* in view of his being a thief?" It is rather the very different question, "Is what *X* did to be considered stealing?" One ought not wantonly endanger another's life. But, when the youth from Tuwol tested out his homemade shotgun, not knowing that Mosew was walking nearby in the cool of the evening, was his act—however unintentional—sufficiently imprudent to constitute 'foolishness'? Was it simply an unfortunate accident and a narrow escape for Mosew, or did the boy wrong him? A moral standard cannot, itself, determine whether it

is applicable to a particular act. It can only direct the determining individuals to its unambiguous core examples; the individual must himself then classify it as falling under the standard or not, according to his interpretation and assessment of the resemblances and the variations he takes to be critical.⁷

Still a third problem arises in trying to live according to a system of morality. Moral standards are part of a culture's view of reality; they are taken for granted as being rooted in the very nature of the world itself, and thus as being inherently immune to conscious human modification. Received moralities are felt to be eternal verities, which means that they find change difficult to incorporate. There is no way to introduce a new moral rule, however needed; no authoritative procedure is felt competent to eliminate an existing moral rule, however dysfunctional it may have become. Both situations defy the logic of the givenness of moral obligations. A man, for example, should not scold another man, unless they are closely related, for it will constitute, to Tiruray, despising. But, suppose the first person has become a municipal policeman and he has spoken concerning the breaking of a law. Tiruray custom knows nothing of municipal police forces or of Philippine laws. Do these new things in Tiruray life alter the obligation of the Tiruray policeman not to interfere in the schemes and activities of another man—for surely that is the rule of custom? The oughts are seen by participants in a morality as facts of life, inexorable and unalterable. The idea of a "new morality" is invariably offensive and threatening to those whose common sense incorporates an older system.

These three difficulties in living according to a conventional morality—the maintenance inefficiency, the generality, and the unalterability of moral obligations—comprise a set of cultural strains inherent in any moral system per se.⁸ In this sense, the difficulties may be viewed as tending toward law. In any society they call for the establishment of a certain set of sociocultural institutions to

7. The literature on the problem of the general and the particular is, of course, immense. For discussions of the problem as it applies directly to moral and legal reasoning, see Hart (1961:121 ff.), Stone (1961:137 ff.).

8. The idea of "cultural strains" is taken from Geertz; see (1964:64).

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serve as practical and adaptive elaborations upon the moral bare bones of normative common sense. These are the legal institutions of a society.

The problem of generality—whether in a particular case a particular obligation did or did not exist—may result, in one society, in authoritative reference to a set of statutes and, in another society, in autonomic ordeals. Maintenance inefficiency may be dealt with among one people by investing their chiefs with absolute adjudicatory authority and punitive power, among others by the development of a complex system of courts and prisons. The unalterability of moral obligation may underlie the emergence of institutions as substantively different as a legislature and an infallible papacy. The problems and their attendant strain toward institutional elaboration are generic; the substantive content of resulting ideas and structures is not.

Institutionalized in different ways in different societies, and internalized to varying degrees in various individuals within any specific society, “the legal” may thus be seen as being related to and emerging from a matrix of “the moral” in the occurrence of this particular cluster of cultural responses.

The rest of this study will describe the legal institutions in Tiruray life which exist to deal authoritatively with precisely such difficulties in the recognition and observance of moral demands.

Reprinted here in full by photo-offset is Chapter Two (pp. 27–57) of Stuart A. Schlegel's *Tiruray Justice: Traditional Tiruray Law and Morality* (1970).

PSR and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Sociological Society express their gratitude to the University of California Press for allowing us thus to put this selection into the hands of those readers, the cooperation and assistance of whose countrymen made this splendid publication possible.

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